Historians Debate FDRs Leadership

While some political analysts of the period and historians since have argued that Roosevelts pull away from the lawful isolationism following World War I was a matter of political maneuvering that directly resulted in the bombing of Pearl Harbor and the subsequent loss of American lives, still others view it as having been a necessity for the security of the world. In his essay, Charles Callan Tansell embraces the isolationist view point that the actions of Roosevelt not only led to the American involvement, but was orchestrated in such a way as to guarantee it. On the other side of the coin, historian Robert Divine viewed Roosevelts actions as a response to the international upheaval created by the spread of Nazism and the Japanese and though America did eventually join the war it was out of necessity and not the personal desire of Roosevelt and his administration. Though Tansell makes a compelling argument, illustrating an almost covert manipulation of American resources to assist the British against the Nazis, from providing destroyers to the British Navy and engaging in sea skirmishes with German U-boats, his facts are too narrow and complimentary to his own point of view to be taken as the only components (9). Noting that Roosevelts support of the British led to the view of America as a non-neutral participant in the offensive against Germany, Tansell makes a leap of reason that pushes this material and ideological support into the realm of provocation and out of reality. He truly pushes his reasoning into the notion of conspiracy when, while not outright stating it is the truth, he implies that Roosevelts administration and the militarys slow-reaction to intelligence that could have prevented the bombing of Pearl Harbor were purposely negligent (12). As Divine explains, there is little, aside from facts taken out of context, to support such a view. Instead, initially weary of a conflict with either Germany or Japan, American leaders sought to remain at a distance from an offensive against the warring countries. When diplomacy failed and the situation began to spread far beyond the original boundaries of Europe and Asia, American leaders could no longer ignore the worldwide threat of leaving such powers unchecked.

Essay 2 Trumans Decision to Drop the Atomic Bomb by Samuel J. Walker
    Samuel J. Walkers middle ground take on Trumans decision to drop the bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki presents the validity behind both the revisionist and traditionalist views of what would become the catalyst in the campaign against the Japanese. While noting the effectiveness of the bombs in forcing the Japanese government to surrender to the Allies, he does support the revisionist sentiment that while the bombs may have been effective they were not as necessary as presented at the time. However, this was based not on necessarily in the manipulation of the facts by officials at the time but rather a genuine belief in the high cost of a continued campaign. Several points, both traditionalist and revisionist in nature, support Walkers interpretation of the event. A need, first and foremost, to end the war was the primary reasoning behind the decision. The other benefits including justification of the large expense of the bomb gaining the diplomatic edge against the Soviet Union the lack of reasons not drop the bombs and lastly, though largely unspoken, a hatred of the Japanese. In viewing the circumstances surrounding the use of the bombs, such as the eventual price tag and the growing negative views of the Japanese due to the war, he shows how a single decision can have many determining factors and beneficial or negative effects. As he explains, the bomb was necessary to end the war at the earliest possible moment  the bomb was probably not necessary to end the war within a fairly short amount of time without an invasion (56). His essay really shows that there is simply no black and white in this debate, but a broad spectrum of gray to support both sides.

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